Popular modes of evaluating teachers are fraught with inaccuracies and inconsistencies, but the field has identified better approaches.

By Linda Darling-Hammond, Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, Edward Haertel, and Jesse Rothstein

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a growing consensus that evidence of teacher contributions to student learning should be part of teacher evaluation systems, along with evidence about the quiltyof teacher practices.

Value-added models"(/AMs)designed to evaluate student test score gains from one yar to Kapthe ne'tare effen promoted as tools to accomplish this goal.



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when students are assigned to teachers randomly. However, students aren't randomly assigned to teachers — and statistical models can't fully adjust for the fact that some teachers will have a dispropor tionate number of students who have greater challenges (e.g., students with poor attendance, who are homeless, who have severe problems at home, etc.) and those whose scores on traditional tests may

that "teacher effectiveness" is not a stable enough Houston as a result of its Education Value-Added with some means of controlling differences in out- "exceeding expectations" by her supervis Amreinportions of the curriculum and less effective in oth the total observations), with wide uctuations from whether the student tests used for the VAM empha Table 2.) It is worth noting that this teacher's lower more or relatively less effective.

Other research indicates that teachers whose for many other teachers. students do best on end-of-year tests aren't always The wide variability shown in this teacher's rat ing students for next year's course (Carrell & West, dictable. As one teacher noted: 2010).

Initial research on using value-added methods to dismiss some teachers and award bonuses to-oth ers shows that value-added ratings often don't agree with ratings from skilled observers and are in u enced by all of the factors described above.

construct to be uniquely identi ed even under ideal Assessment System (EVAAS) scores was a 10-year conditions (for example, with random assignment veteran who had been voted Teacher of the Month of teachers to schools and students to teachers, and and Teacher of the Year and was rated each year as of-school effects). Furthermore, some teachers may Beardsley & Collins, in press). She showed positive be effective at some forms of instruction or in some VA scores on 8 of 16 tests over four years (50% of ers. If so, their rated effectiveness would depend on year to year, both across and within subjects. (See size skills and topics for which the teacher is relatively value-added in 4th grade, when English learners are mainstreamed in Houston, was also a pattern

effective at promoting longer-run achievement for ings from year to year, like that documented in many their students. Thus, VAM-style measures may be other studies, wasn't unusual for Houston teachers in uenced by how much the teacher emphasizes in this analysis, regardless of whether the teacher short-run test preparation. One study even found was terminated. Teachers said they couldn't identify that teachers who raised end-of-course grades mosta relationship between their instructional practices were, on average, less effective than others at prepar and their value-added ratings, which appear unpre

> I do what I do every year. I teach the way I teach every year. [My] rst year got me pats on the back; [my] second year got me kicked in the backside. And for year three, my scores were off the charts. I got a huge bonus, and now I am in the top quartile of all the English teachers. What did I do differently? I have no clue (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, in press).

Another teacher classi ed her past three years as "bonus, bonus, disaster." And another noted:

We had an 8th-grade teacher, a very good teacher, the "real science guy". . . [but] every year he showed low EVAAS growth. My principal ipped him with the 6th-grade science teacher who was getting the highest EVAAS scores on campus. Huge EVAAS scores. [And] now the 6th-grade teacher [is showing] no growth, but the 8th-grade teacher who was sent down is getting the biggest bonuses on campus.

This example of two teachers whose value-added ratings ip-opped when they exchanged assign ments is an example of a phenomenon found in other studies that document a larger association between the class taught and value-added ratings than the individual teacher effect itself. The notion that there is a stable "teacher effect" that's a function of the teacher's teaching ability or effectiveness is called into question if the speci c class or grade-level as signment is a stronger predictor of the value-added rating than the teacher.

Another Houston teacher whose supervisor con sistently rated her as "exceeding expectations" or "pro cient" and who also was receiving positive VA scores about 50% of the time, had a noticeable drop tial share of their compensation tied to their VAM English language learners transitioned into her class room. Overall, the study found that, in this system:

learners (ELLs) are transitioned into mainstreamed classrooms are the least likely to show "added value."

UÑ/i>VîÅÈÑ wÑ'>Å€iÑ›Þ-LiÅÈÑ wÑÈ₱òNalÞoʻffÑhiès♣eVæa\$ons>ðfind more, most research to have lower "value-added" scores, on average.

added because their students are already near National Research Council, 2009.) the top of the test score range.

UÑ,>Ó⇔ÈÑV^>>€iÑV→È⟨`iÅ>L'çÑå´ change grade levels, often from "ineffective" to "effective" and vice versa.

These kinds of comments from teachers were typical:

Every year, I have the highest test scores, [and] I have fellow teachers that come up to me when they get their bonuses . . . One recently came up to me [and] literally cried, 'I'm so sorry.' . . . I'm like, 'Don't be sorry. It's not your fault.' Here I am . . . with the highest test scores, and I'm getting \$0 in bonuses. It makes no sense year to year how this works. You know, I don't know what to do. I don't know how to get higher than 100%.

I went to a transition classroom, and now there's a red ag next to my name. I guess now I'm an ineffective teacher? I keep getting letters from the district, saying 'You've been recognized as an outstanding teacher' . . . this, this, and that. But now because I teach English language learners who 'transition in,' my scores drop? And I get a ag next to my name for not teaching them well? (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, in press).

A study of Tennessee teachers who volunteered to be evaluated based on VAMs and to have a substan in her value-added ratings when a large number of results, corroborated this evidence: After three years, 85% thought the VAM evaluation ignored important aspects of their performance that test scores didn't measure, and two-thirds thought VAM didn't fective teachers (Springer et al., 2010).

Other approaches

students in mainstreamed classrooms are also found ers have concluded that value-added modeling is not appropriate as a primary measure for evaluating-in UÑ/i>VîiÅÈÑ wÑ€‹wÓi`ÑÈÓÞ`i›ÓdĒviðNuĒalîteådHeirsÓ(Ódei,Ñtöär>eixæminβle, Braun, 2005;

While value-added models based on test scores

EVAAS scores (Teacher A)	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010
	GRADE 5	GRADE 4	GRADE 3	GRADE 3
Math	-2.03	+0.68*	+0.16*	+03.26
Reading	-1.15	-0.96*	+2.03	+1.81
Language arts	+1.12	-0.49*	-1.77	-0.20*
Science	+2.37	-3.45	n/a	n/a
Social studies	+0.91*	-2.39	n/a	n/a
ASPIRE bonus	\$3,400	\$700	\$3,700	\$0

Notes: The scores with asterisks (*) signify that the scores are not detectably different from the reference gain scores of other teachers across Houston Independent School District within one standard error; however, the scores are still reported to both the teachers and their supervisors as they are here.

TABLE

ground evaluation in student learning in more stable ways. Typically, performance assessments ask teach ers to document their plans and teaching for a unit



and timely decision making by an appropriate body. National Research Council, Board on Testing and Assessment.

With these features in place, evaluation can be come a more useful part of a productive teaching and certi cation programs. Washington, DC: National Academies learning system, supporting accurate information about teachers, helpful feedback, and well-grounded personnel decisions.

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